



Proposition 8 Is Unconstitutional, But Not Because the 
Ninth Circuit Said So: The Equal Protection Clause  
Does Not Support a Legal Distinction Between  
Denying the Right to Same-Sex Marriage and  
Not Providing It in the First Place 
Nathan Rouse* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, advocates for marriage equality1 lost a hard-fought and 
contentious campaign battle in California: voters approved Proposition 8 
and eliminated the right to same-sex marriage.2 The battle, however, had 
only begun. Two same-sex couples whose plans to marry had been can-
celled by the passage of Proposition 8 sued the state in federal district 
court, maintaining that Proposition 8 violates the Constitution.3  They 
won. The district court issued a landmark decision in which the court 
broadly held that banning same-sex marriage violates both the Equal Pro-
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 1. This Note will use the terms “marriage equality” and “same-sex marriage.” Although the 
term “gay marriage” is widely used, it is noninclusive. For example, the term does not include bi-
sexual or transgendered persons. See Patrick Busch, Is Same-Sex Marriage A Threat to Traditional 
Marriages?: How Courts Struggle with the Question, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 143, 143 
n.1 (2011). But see Monte Neil Stewart, Genderless Marriage, Institutional Realities, and Judicial 
Elision, 1 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 n.6 (2006) (choosing the term “genderless mar-
riage” because “same-sex marriage” suggests something different from opposite-sex marriages). 
 2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (“Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recog-
nized in California.”). 
 3. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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tection Clause and a person’s fundamental right to marry.4 Then, four 
and a half years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court’s ruling—but on significantly narrower legal grounds. 5 
Now, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari.6 
This Note is about the Ninth Circuit’s decision. In Perry v. Brown, 
the Ninth Circuit held that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional. But in doing 
so, the court stepped back from the breadth of the district court’s deci-
sion. The Ninth Circuit did not address whether same-sex marriage is a 
fundamental constitutional right. Nor did the Ninth Circuit address 
whether the Equal Protection Clause categorically prevents states from 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples. Instead, the Ninth Circuit 
reached the narrow conclusion that Proposition 8 violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because it withdrew a preexisting legal right from a mar-
ginalized group without any legitimate purpose.7 
But U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not support the narrowness 
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perry because the difference between 
withdrawing and withholding the right to same-sex marriage is not legal-
ly significant. Rather, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, any denial of the right to same-sex marriage is unconstitu-
tional. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Romer v. Evans and U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture v. Moreno to mean that taking away a right is legally 
distinct from not providing a right in the first place.8 But these cases do 
not stand for this proposition. Instead, Romer and Moreno stand for the 
proposition that animus toward a specific group of people, on its own, is 
never a rational basis for a law.9 While the government had indeed with-
                                                 
 4. Id. at 995, 997. The Equal Protection Clause provides, “No State shall . . . deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 5. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 
7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
 6. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012). In addition to Hol-
lingsworth, the Court granted certiorari in a case presenting the question of whether the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the federal government from exclusively recognizing opposite-sex marriages 
pursuant to the Defense of Marriage Act. See United States v. Windsor, 81 U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. 
Dec. 7, 2012). Oral argument in Hollingsworth will take place on March 26, 2013; oral argument in 
Windsor will take place the following day. October Term, SUPREMECOURT.GOV (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalMar2013.p
df. A decision is expected sometime in June. Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Two Challenges on Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/08/us/supreme-court-
agrees-to-hear-two-cases-on-gay-marriage.html. 
 7. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1095. 
 8. Id. at 1083. 
 9. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Romer and the Limits of Legitimacy: Stripping Opponents of Gay 
and Lesbian Rights of Their “First Line of Defense” in the Same-Sex Marriage Fight, 24 J. 
CONTEMP. L. 217, 242 (1998). 
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drawn a previously recognized right in both cases, this fact was signifi-
cant only to the extent that it provided evidence of animus.10 As such, the 
Ninth Circuit was correct in concluding that Proposition 8 lacks a ration-
al basis and can be explained only by animus.11 The court, however, was 
incorrect in creating a withdrawal–withholding distinction that limits the 
applicability of its decision. 
The Ninth Circuit should have held that the Equal Protection Clause 
prohibits any denial of the right to same-sex marriage, regardless of 
whether it is withdrawn or withheld. As the decision stands, Perry only 
provides legal protection to same-sex marriage in the event that a state 
has granted the right, but then takes it away.12 Perry is unnecessarily 
meaningless in states that have never allowed same-sex marriage.13 Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit, but disre-
gard its reasoning. The Court should instead adopt the district court’s 
reasoning. 
Part II provides background information on the facts and district 
court bench trial that led to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perry. Part III 
then summarizes and explains the decision. Part IV argues that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence does not support the nar-
rowness of the Perry court’s holding. Part V concludes. 
II. PROPOSITION 8 AND THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION 
On November 4, 2008, California voters eliminated the right to 
same-sex marriage by approving Proposition 8.14 The passage of Propo-
                                                 
 10. See Michael C. Dorf, Does the 9th Circuit Prop 8 Ruling Recognize a Constitutional En-
dowment Effect?, DORF ON L. (Feb. 7, 2012, 3:37 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/02/does-9th-
circuit-prop-8-ruling.html (“[The court’s] reasoning is sounder if one understands the references to 
taking away as simply evidence of animus.”). 
 11. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1095. 
 12. Only one state falls in this category: California. See Robin West, Reaction: A Marriage Is a 
Marriage Is a Marriage: The Limits of Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 47, 48 (2012), 
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/issues/125/february12/forum_828.php (“Perry v. Brown is noth-
ing more than a sui generis decision for a unique set of facts.”). 
 13. In this category are the other forty states where same-sex marriage is not allowed. Nine 
states—Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, 
and Washington—as well as the District of Columbia, the Suquamish Indian Tribe, and the Coquille 
Indian Tribe allow same-sex marriage. Where State Laws Stand, FREEDOM TO MARRY, 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/where-state-laws-stand (last visited Feb. 18, 2013); William 
Yardley, A Washington State Indian Tribe Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/12/us/12tribe.html. 
 14. Jessie McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06marriage.html. That same day, voters in 
two other states, Florida and Arizona, passed similar bans on same-sex marriage. Id. There are cur-
rently thirty-five states with laws against same-sex marriage. See Where State Laws Stand, supra 
note 13. 
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sition 8, which overturned In re Marriage Cases (the Marriage Cases), a 
California Supreme Court decision that had legalized same-sex mar-
riage,15 ended a 141-day period during which thousands of same-sex 
couples married.16 The following section tells two stories: how Proposi-
tion 8 came to pass and how a federal district judge later struck it down. 
A. Background 
The legality of same-sex marriage has a tumultuous history in Cali-
fornia. In 1999, California became the first state to legislatively extend 
legal status to same-sex couples when it enacted a domestic partnership 
registry.17 But the following year, not long after President Bill Clinton 
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),18 California enacted a 
nearly identical law.19 Proposition 22, a successful voter initiative, statu-
torily restricted the availability of marriage to heterosexual couples.20 
Four years later, San Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom deliberately diso-
beyed the law and ordered the county clerk’s office to grant marriage 
licenses to all couples, regardless of sex.21 The clerk’s office followed 
the mayor’s orders until, several weeks later, the California Supreme 
Court directed the Mayor to comply with state law.22 
Days later, the City of San Francisco initiated a lawsuit in state 
court seeking a declaratory judgment that Proposition 22 had violated the 
                                                 
 15. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 16. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (1998); Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships: A 
Comparison, EQUALITY MAINE, http://equalitymaine.org/marriage-civil-unions-and-domestic-
partnerships-comparison (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). California has since expanded the rights avail-
able under domestic partnership status such that the law provides, in effect, everything but the label 
of marriage. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a) (2003) (“Registered domestic partners shall have the 
same rights . . . as are granted to and imposed upon spouses.”). 
 18. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man 
and one woman . . . .”), invalidated by Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3116, (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307). After the Hawaii Supreme Court held 
that strict scrutiny was the appropriate measure for determining the constitutionality of statutes limit-
ing same-sex marriage to heterosexual couples, see Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), a 
conservative outcry over the prospect that states would soon legalize same-sex marriage led to 
DOMA. Although President Clinton has never apologized for signing DOMA, in the years since 
doing so he has voiced support for same-sex marriage. See Defending DOMA, NYMAG.COM (Feb. 
26, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/bill-clinton-doma-2012-3 (quoting President Clinton’s 
various stances on the issue). 
 19. Evelyn Nieves, Those Opposed to 2 Initiatives Had Little Chance from Start, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/us/2000-campaign-california-those-opposed-2-
initiatives-had-little-chance-start.html. 
 20. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2000) (limiting marriage to “between a man and a woman”). 
 21. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927. 
 22. Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.3d 459, 499 (Cal. 2004). 
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state constitution.23 The trial court agreed,24 but the California Court of 
Appeals did not.25 The issue appeared before the California Supreme 
Court the following year. 
1. The California Supreme Court’s Legalization of Same-Sex Marriage 
in the Marriage Cases 
In a 4-3 decision issued May 15, 2008, the California Supreme 
Court declared that Proposition 22, and any denial of the right to same-
sex marriage, was prohibited under its state constitution, thus legalizing 
same-sex marriage in California.26 The court invalidated Proposition 22 
after determining that all Californians have a fundamental state constitu-
tional right to marry whomever they please.27 Moreover, although do-
mestic partnership status provided an avenue to receiving the same sub-
stantive legal rights enjoyed by married couples,28 attaching a separate 
designation to that bundle of rights was a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.29 Notably, the court applied strict scrutiny, not rational basis 
review or even intermediate scrutiny, in its equal protection analysis.30 
Heightened review was appropriate, the court explained, because Propo-
sition 22 blocked a historically marginalized group from obtaining a sig-
nificant legal right on the basis of a characteristic similar to gender and 
race.31 
                                                 
 23. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). 
 24. In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title Rule [1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 
2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005), rev’d in part, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006), rev’d, 183 P.3d 384. 
 25. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675. 
 26. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453. 
 27. Id. 
 28. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(a). 
 29. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 443. 
 30. Id. at 442. When a law is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, courts use one of 
three levels of scrutiny to decide whether the law is constitutional: strict scrutiny, intermediate scru-
tiny, or rational basis review. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719 (3d ed. 2009). To 
withstand strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compel-
ling purpose. Id. Under intermediate scrutiny, the law must be substantially related to an important 
purpose. Id. The lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis review, requires only that the law be rational-
ly related to a legitimate purpose. Id. at 720. This three-tiered system has, however, come under 
attack as an inflexible and insensible way to apply the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Marcy 
Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 141 (2011) (exploring 
the “inconsistencies and absurdities” that result from conducting equal protection analysis under the 
three levels of review). 
 31. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442. 
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In the months following the Marriage Cases, around 18,000 same-
sex couples got married in California.32 But for those celebrating the 
court’s landmark decision, the celebration did not last long. Even before 
the high court reached its decision in the Marriage Cases, opponents of 
same-sex marriage were already on their way to overturning it.33 
2. Campaign and Passage of Proposition 8 
In October 2007, months before the Marriage Cases, Protect Mar-
riage, the same group responsible for Proposition 22, filed another initia-
tive.34 This time, however, rather than seeking to amend California’s 
family laws as Proposition 22 did, Protect Marriage sought to amend the 
state constitution.35 The California Marriage Protection Act, or Proposi-
tion 8 as it later came to be known, proposed adding a section to the state 
constitution expressly providing that California only recognizes marriag-
es between a man and a woman.36 To qualify for the ballot, Proposition 8 
needed enough signatures from registered voters to exceed eight percent 
of the number of votes counted in California’s most recent gubernatorial 
election.37 At the time, at least 694,354 were needed.38 
Just weeks before the state supreme court struck down Proposition 
22, supporters of Proposition 8 submitted 1,120,801 signatures, far ex-
ceeding the requisite amount to qualify for the November 2008 ballot.39 
In the months to come, as thousands of same-sex couples exercised their 
long-awaited right to marry, Protect Marriage carried out a massive 
                                                 
 32. Jesse McKinley, Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Set for Tuesday in California, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 22, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/23/us/23calif.html?ref=samesexmarriage. 
 33. See Letters from Dennis Hollingsworth et al. to Initiative Coordinator, Office of the Cal. 
Att’y Gen. (Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/cms_pdfs/initiatives/i737_07-
0068_Initiative.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The initiative included the following proposed language: 
SECTION 1. Title 
This measure shall be known and may be cited as the “California Marriage Protec-
tion Act.” 
SECTION 2. Article I, Section 7.5 is added to the California Constitution, to read: 
Sec. 7.5. Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in Cali-
fornia. 
Id. 
 37. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b). 
 38. See Press Release, Secretary of State Debra Bowen Certifies Eighth Measure for November 
4, 2008, General Election (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/admin/press-
releases/2008/DB08-068.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
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statewide campaign to eliminate that right.40 Religious and conservative 
groups quickly mobilized to rally support for the initiative in Califor-
nia.41 As they did so, organizations across the country donated millions 
of dollars to the effort and the initiative drive was quickly on its way to 
becoming the most expensive election fight over a social issue in U.S. 
history.42 Offensive television commercials and billboards spread quickly 
throughout the state, using bigoted stereotypes and false information to 
encourage voters to ban same-sex marriage.43 Supporters of marriage 
equality fought back against the initiative and garnered similar national 
support,44 but their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. Due to Protect 
Marriage’s substantial support from powerful religious organizations,45 
and a deficit in public support for marriage equality,46  Proposition 8 
passed on November 4, 2008, with 52% of the vote.47 
While many across the country celebrated President Obama’s his-
toric election, reaction in California to the passage of Proposition 8 was 
                                                 
 40. Laurie Goodstein, A Line in the Sand for Same-Sex Marriage Foes, N.Y. TIMES 2 (Oct. 26, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/27/us/27right.html?pagewanted=2. 
 41. Id. 
 42. California Voters Approve Proposition 8 Gay Marriage Ban, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 5, 2008), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/3387562/California-voters-approve-Proposition-8-gay-
marriage-ban.html. 
 43. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“The campaign 
conveyed a message that gay people and relationships are inferior, that homosexuality is undesirable 
and that children need to be protected from exposure to gay people and their relationships.”). A 
particularly egregious example of the Proposition 8 campaign’s tactics is a television advertisement 
depicting a young girl rushing home after school to tell her mother, “I learned how a prince married 
a prince and how I can marry a princess”—the commercial then abruptly cuts to an ominous voice 
warning viewers, “Think it can happen? It’s already happened.” Yes on Proposition 8, It’s Already 
Happened, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0PgjcgqFYP4; see also 
John Wildermuth, Report: Anti-Gay TV Ads Swayed Prop. 8 Voters, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2010/08/03/ba8n1eof15.dtl (“The anti-gay side 
knows how to stimulate and exploit anti-gay prejudices.” (quoting David Fleischer, author of the 
Prop. 8 Report)). 
 44. See California Voters Approve Proposition 8 Gay Marriage Ban, supra note 42; see also 
Julie Bloom, Brad Pitt Supports Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/arts/19arts-bradpittsupp_brf.html. 
 45. See, e.g., Jessie McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Mar-
riage, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/politics/15marriage.html. 
By no means, however, was the Mormon Church alone in its support of Proposition 8—other major 
contributors included Focus on the Family, the Catholic Fraternal Group, the Knights of Columbus, 
and the American Family Association. See Goodstein, supra note 40. 
 46. See California Voters Approve Proposition 8 Gay Marriage Ban, supra note 42. Although 
Proposition 22 passed with substantial support in 2000—62%, see Nieves, supra note 19—
supporters of marriage equality had expected public opinion to have changed since that time. 
 47. McKinley, supra note 32. 
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swift and pronounced. 48  In the week following the general election, 
same-sex marriage advocates protested on the steps of the state capitol 
and in front of organizations that had supported the initiative.49  One 
demonstration outside of a Mormon temple in Oakland was so large that 
the California State Patrol had to shut down nearby highway ramps to 
protect the crowd from traffic.50 
Legal action was not far behind—cities across California quickly 
petitioned the state supreme court to review the legality of the initia-
tive.51 In asserting the substantive unconstitutionality of Proposition 8, 
they argued alternatively that revisions to the state constitution require 
approval from the state legislature.52 The following year, however, the 
court upheld Proposition 8, concluding that the measure was a valid use 
of the voter initiative process.53 And even though the Marriage Cases 
had established a constitutional right to same-sex marriage only one year 
prior, the court interpreted that decision as enshrining only the right to 
enter into a “protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitu-
tionally based incidents of marriage.”54 The court reasoned that, because 
the initiative did not disturb the legality of domestic partnerships, same-
sex couples had not lost any substantive rights, only the “designation of 
marriage.”55 
Having upheld Proposition 8, the California Supreme Court not on-
ly devastated supporters of marriage equality, but also left them wonder-
ing where to go next.56 Many set their sights on future state elections as 
an opportunity to pass an initiative of their own, one that would invali-
date Proposition 8 and reinstate the right to same-sex marriage.57 Others 
                                                 
 48 . In California, Protests over Gay Marriage Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/us/10protest.html?ref=californiasproposition8samesexmarriage. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Jessie McKinley, Top Court in California Will Review Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 
2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/us/20marriage.html. 
 52. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (No. S168047). 
 53. Strauss, 207 P.3d at 116. The only saving grace for same-sex couples in California was the 
court’s decision to leave undisturbed the legality of the nearly 18,000 same-sex marriages performed 
during the summer of 2008. See id. at 121. 
 54. Id. at 75. 
 55. Id. In other words, the court somehow concluded that Proposition 8 did not “fundamentally 
alter the meaning and substance of state constitutional equal protection principles as articulated in 
[the Marriage Cases].” Id. at 61. 
 56. John Schwartz, California High Court Upholds Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/27marriage.html. 
 57. Jesse McKinley, Proposition’s Opponents Say Fight Will Continue, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27react.html. 
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felt that with a Democratic majority in Congress, and a newly elected 
Democratic president, the best option was a push for federal legislation.58 
Yet some saw an avenue in federal court. In a case that would make 
national headlines for years to come,59 two same-sex couples, Kristin 
Perry and Sandy Stier, and Paul Katami and Jeffery Zarrillo, filed a com-
plaint in the Northern District of California on May 22, 2009.60 Their 
argument was simple: Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution’s 
guarantees of due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.61 
B. Trial 
On the first day of a twelve-day bench trial in January 2010, Judge 
Vaughn Walker interrupted both parties’ opening statements more than 
once to remind them that this case was to be about evidence, not rheto-
ric.62 Specifically, it was to be about evidence that answered the follow-
ing question: as a matter of fact and law, does denying the right to same-
sex marriage violate the U.S. Constitution? 
In arguing that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional, plaintiffs present-
ed extensive testimony from eight lay witnesses and nine expert witness-
es.63 Generally, lay witnesses were Californians in same-sex relation-
ships who emphasized three points: (1) a domestic partnership is not the 
same as a marriage, and this difference had caused them hardships;64 (2) 
                                                 
 58. Jeremy W. Peters, Debate over Gay March Exposes Split in Approach, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/10/us/10march.html. 
 59. Adding notable attention to the lawsuit, plaintiffs’ attorneys were Ted Olson and David 
Boies. The last time that Olson, a longtime Republican who had served in the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, appeared in court with Boies, a longtime Democrat, was when Olson and Boies 
faced off in the landmark decision, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Jesse McKinley, Two Ideolog-
ical Foes Unite to Overturn Proposition 8, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/01/11/us/11prop8.html. For a succinct background on Ted Olson’s decision to support the fight 
for marriage equality, see Eve Conant, The Conscience of a Conservative, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/08/the-conscience-of-a-conservative.html. 
 60. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (No. CV 09-2292-VRW). The named defendants, among them Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, declined to defend Proposition 8; as such, the district court allowed the initiative’s 
supporters to intervene, pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Perry v. 
Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) 
(No. 12-144) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)). 
 61. Complaint for Declaratory Relief at §§ 40–44, Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 
CV 09-2292-VRW). 
 62. Jesse McKinley, Personal Focus as Same-Sex-Marriage Trial Opens in California, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/us/12prop8.html. 
 63. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 932. 
 64. See id. at 932–33. To give an example of this difference and the everyday difficulties it 
causes, one witness testified that when he and his partner went to a bank and asked to open a joint 
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marrying the person whom they love would provide significant meaning 
and happiness to their lives;65 and (3) being denied the right to marry 
excludes them from the rest of society.66 The expert witnesses focused on 
the societal and personal benefits of marriage, its history as an institution, 
and the ways in which marriage equality would improve California.67 
Defense counsel for Proposition 868 pursued a different strategy. 
Having had difficulty gathering witnesses, their case revolved around the 
presentation of two expert witnesses and two taped depositions; they 
spent the rest of their time cross-examining the plaintiffs’ witnesses.69 
Not a single official representative of the Proposition 8 campaign testi-
fied at trial.70 The defense’s first expert witness argued three points: (1) 
the purpose of marriage is to regulate procreation; (2) children would be 
less likely to succeed if society encourages marriages that cannot result 
in biological children; and (3) same-sex marriage would erode the insti-
tution of marriage.71 The second expert maintained that same-sex couples 
possess significant political power in both California and the rest of the 
country, and therefore, had not been “invidious[ly]” discriminated 
against by Proposition 8.72 For support, he cited instances where “reli-
gious, political, and corporate” assistance had helped secure victories for 
same-sex rights.73 Neither expert fared well on cross-examination.74 
                                                                                                             
account, the teller assumed that because they were “partners,” they must want a business account. Id. 
at 933. Another witness provided an additional example: “I’m a 45-year-old woman. I have been in 
love with a woman for 20 years and I don’t have a word to tell anybody about that.” Id. 
 65. Id. at 933. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 940–44. Not only would the right to same-sex marriage provide personal benefits to 
same-sex couples, it would provide substantial economic benefits to the State of California. Id. at 
941. 
 68. The parties defending Proposition 8 were not the defendants named in the lawsuit—state 
representatives, including former Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, refused to defend the initiative. 
Appearing in defense of Proposition 8 were representatives of the groups Protect Marriage and Yes 
on 8. See id. at 921. 
 69. Id. at 944–50. To explain its minimal support, the defense told the court that previously 
scheduled witnesses had declined for fear of appearing on television and suffering retaliation from 
opponents of Proposition 8. The court, however, was not convinced. Id. at 944. The U.S. Supreme 
Court had in fact foreclosed the possibility of witnesses appearing on television when a divided 
bench issued a permanent stay on broadcasting the trial. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 
(2010). After the Court’s decision, however, defense counsel for Proposition 8 made no attempt to 
call the allegedly frightened witnesses to the stand after the Court eliminated the risk of unwanted 
publicity. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 70. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 944. 
 71. Id. at 950–52. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 951. 
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C. Judge Vaughn Walker’s Ruling 
After considering the evidence, Judge Vaughn Walker, in an 
eighty-three-page opinion, directed judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
and struck down Proposition 8.75 His findings of fact, eighty of them in 
total, amounted to an extensively thorough and detailed evidentiary rec-
ord.76 Judge Walker organized his findings under three questions: (1) Are 
there good reasons to ban same-sex marriage? (2) Does California bene-
fit by distinguishing between marriage and domestic partnerships? (3) 
Does Proposition 8 further a legitimate state interest or does it only ad-
vance personal moral values? As a matter of fact, the answer to each 
question was “no.”77 While plaintiffs’ witnesses had put forth credible 
witness testimony, and that testimony found support in both evolving 
historical norms and societal values, defense counsel had summarily 
failed to convince the court of its case.78 Judge Walker saw little reason 
to give credit to either of the defense’s expert witnesses—not only was 
their testimony undermined by a lack of established, peer-reviewed re-
search, one witness had made previous statements directly contradicting 
his in-court testimony.79 Moreover, substantial evidence indicated that 
Proposition 8 was driven by religious values and moral disapproval.80 
Turning to his conclusions of law, Judge Walker ruled that Proposi-
tion 8 violates the constitutional rights to due process and equal protec-
tion under the law.81 Addressing the right to due process, the judge ex-
plained as follows. First, the fundamental constitutional right to marry, as 
established in Supreme Court jurisprudence, applies to same-sex couples 
and opposite-sex couples alike.82 Second, California’s domestic partner-
                                                                                                             
 74. See, e.g., id. at 950 (“Blankenhorn was unwilling to answer many questions directly on 
cross-examination and was defensive in his answers”); id. at 952 (“Miller stated he had not investi-
gated the ways in which anti-gay stereotypes may have influenced Proposition 8 voters.”). 
 75. See Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1004. 
 76. Id. at 953–1003. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 931 (“While proponents vigorously defended the constitutionality of Proposition 8, 
they did so based on legal conclusions and cross-examinations of some of plaintiffs’ witnesses, 
eschewing all but a rather limited factual presentation.”). 
 79. Id. at 952. The second expert witness, contrary to his testimony that same-sex couples have 
substantial political power, had published a book in which he stated that “the direct initiative system, 
by bypassing checks and balances, is weighted heavily toward majority rule at the expense of certain 
minorities,” those minorities including “homosexuals.” See Kenneth P. Miller, Constraining Popu-
lism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1037, 1057 (2001) (empha-
sis added). 
 80. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 938. 
 81. Id. at 991–1002. 
 82. Id. at 991–93 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 
374 (1978)). 
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ship benefits are insufficient as a proxy for the right to marry.83 Third, 
Proposition 8 is unconstitutional because the denial of a fundamental 
right requires a compelling government interest, and defendants had 
failed to demonstrate one.84 Addressing the right to equal protection, 
Judge Walker began by emphasizing that, like laws targeting groups 
based on race or gender, Proposition 8 singles out same-sex couples for 
disparate treatment.85 Even though this type of classification merits strict 
scrutiny, the judge considered heightened review unnecessary because 
the initiative could not even withstand rational basis review.86  In re-
sponse to six purportedly legitimate interests furthered by Proposition 
8,87 the court dismissed each as baseless and concluded by noting that 
private moral disapproval can never provide a legitimate basis for laws.88 
Judge Walker’s ruling sparked celebrations reminiscent of the state 
supreme court’s decision in the Marriage Cases. 89  To many, such a 
sweeping federal condemnation of laws limiting the right to marriage, 
supported so thoroughly by factual determinations, had serious implica-
tions for the future of same-sex marriage across the entire country.90 But 
the fight was not over. Having recorded a decisive trial court victory in 
the fight to overturn Proposition 8, the next stop was the Ninth Circuit.91 
                                                 
 83. Id. at 993–94 
 84. Id. at 994–1002 (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374). 
 85. Id. at 994. 
 86. Id. at 995. For an explanation of the three levels of review, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
30. 
 87. Defense counsel put forth the following as rational bases for upholding Proposition 8: 
(1) [R]eserving marriage as a union between a man and a woman and excluding any other 
relationship from marriage; (2) proceeding with caution when implementing social 
changes; (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over same-sex parenting; (4) protecting 
the freedom of those who oppose marriage for same-sex couples; (5) treating same-sex 
couples differently from opposite-sex couples; and (6) any other conceivable interest. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998. 
 88. Id. at 1003. 
 89. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & John Schwartz, Court Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban in 
California, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05prop.html. 
 90. John Schwartz, In Same-Sex Ruling, an Eye on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/06assess.html. 
 91. Before it arrived at the Ninth Circuit, the case made a quick stop at the California Supreme 
Court after the Ninth Circuit requested guidance on a standing issue. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 
1002 (Cal. 2011). Because the state representatives originally named as defendants in the lawsuit 
refused to defend Proposition 8, the Ninth Circuit needed to know whether the intervening parties, 
Protect Marriage and Yes on 8, had standing to defend the initiative. Id at 1005. The court concluded 
that they did. Id. at 1035. Whether the U.S. Supreme Court agrees is another matter—observers have 
noted the possibility that the Court will dispose of the case on this standing issue, and thus, avoid 
making any decisions about the constitutionality of same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, 
Commentary on Marriage Grants: Different Ways of Splitting the Difference—The Menu of Options 
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III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN PERRY V. BROWN 
On appeal before the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel upheld the 
trial court’s ruling that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional in a 2-1 decision 
written by Judge Reinhardt.92 From the outset, the court emphasized that 
Proposition 8 caused a singular effect: the deprivation of a previously 
held right to marry, “nothing more, nothing less.”93 Because California 
had legalized same-sex marriage in the Marriage Cases, the state had 
provided thousands of couples with the option of designating themselves 
as “married” rather than as “domestic partners.”94 By removing this new 
legal entitlement, Proposition 8 serves only to “lessen the status and hu-
man dignity” of same-sex couples.95 But Judge Reinhardt understood 
these facts as posing a different constitutional question than if California 
had never extended the right at all. In other words, he created a distinc-
tion between withdrawing the right and withholding it: 
We need not and do not answer the broader question in this case, 
however, because California had already extended to committed 
same-sex couples both the incidents of marriage and the official 
designation of “marriage,” and Proposition 8’s only effect was to 
take away that important and legally significant designation, while 
leaving in place all of its incidents. This unique and strictly limited 
effect of Proposition 8 allows us to address the amendment’s consti-
tutionality on narrow grounds.96 
Thus, the court did not address whether same-sex marriage is a fun-
damental constitutional right, nor did it address whether withholding the 
right to marry from same-sex couples violates the Equal Protection 
Clause.97 The way the Ninth Circuit saw it, these issues were not before 
                                                                                                             
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Dec. 8, 2012, 9:48 AM), http://www.scotus 
blog.com/?p=156327. 
 92. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). Judge Stephen Reinhardt wrote the majority, which Judge Michael 
Hawkins joined. Judge N. Randy Smith, dissenting, would have overturned the district court’s ruling. 
Id. at 1096. In Judge Smith’s opinion, Proposition 8 is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose. Id. In support of his position, he cited, rather crassly, Justice Potter Stewart’s concurrence 
in Zablocki v. Redhail for the proposition that states can prohibit certain kinds of marriages, such as 
those between siblings, more than two people, or children. Id. at 1098 (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“‘Surely, for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or her sibling, that no 
one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can marry without first passing an exami-
nation for venereal disease, or that no one can marry who has a living husband or wife.’” (quoting 
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 392 (1978))). 
 93. Id. at 1063. 
 94. Id. at 1077. 
 95. Id. at 1063. 
 96. Id. at 1064. 
 97. Id. 
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the court. Thus, rather than write what it perceived would be dicta, the 
Ninth Circuit only addressed the following question: does withdrawing 
the right to marry from same-sex couples violate the Equal Protection 
Clause?98 
In answering “yes,” the court drew support from Romer v. Evans 
where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a voter-enacted constitution-
al amendment that had limited the rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) citizens in Colorado.99 In Romer, a 
successful voter initiative called Amendment 2 had invalidated a series 
of municipal and county laws that specifically outlawed discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.100 The initiative had also banned local 
and state government from enacting similar laws in the future.101 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that Amendment 2 was unconsti-
tutional because the Equal Protection Clause precludes laws that impose 
“disfavored legal status” on a particular group of citizens.102 The Court 
arrived at this conclusion after noting that animus alone can never pro-
vide a rational basis for laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.103 Be-
cause Colorado had failed to establish a rational basis for Amendment 2, 
the initiative had been enacted in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause.104 
To the Ninth Circuit, Proposition 8 was just like Amendment 2: 
both laws (1) targeted a group of people and altered its legal status; (2) 
withdrew previously established rights; (3) refused equal protection un-
                                                 
 98. See id. Most commentators have understood Judge Reinhardt’s decision to frame this issue 
narrowly as an attempt to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from reversing the district court’s rejec-
tion of Proposition 8. Whether this strategy will work is anybody’s guess, but at least some observers 
think the Court might take the bait. See Jane Schacter, Reaction: Splitting the Difference: Reflections 
on Perry v. Brown, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 72, 73 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/is 
sues/125/march12/forum_858.php (“[T]he appellate court’s limited approach is more likely than the 
district court’s approach to either be embraced by the Supreme Court or stand unreviewed.”). But see 
Orin Kerr, Thoughts on the Road From Walker to Reinhardt to Kennedy, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 
8, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/02/08/thoughts-on-the-road-from-walker-to-reinhardt-to-
kennedy (“I have no idea what the Supreme Court might do in the Perry case. But my own sense is 
that Judges Walker and Reinhardt are not quite as clever as some people seem to think. Or, at the 
very least, the reasoning of their opinions don’t [sic] really matter very much.”); Jason Mazzone, 
Marriage and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012, 7:18 PM), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down.html (“[I]t strikes me 
as most unlikely that Kennedy would adhere to Reinhardt’s twisted version of Romer to invalidate 
Proposition 8.”). 
 99. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1080 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
 100. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 633–34. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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der the law in a “literal sense”; (4) relegated LGBTQ citizens to a soli-
tary class; and (5) “constitutionalize[d]” that class’s disadvantages.105 
Moreover, the court saw no meaningful difference in the fact that 
Amendment 2 invalidated a broad spectrum of legal rights while Proposi-
tion 8 only eliminated the right to marry.106 Rather, “the surgical preci-
sion” with which Proposition 8 targeted the rights of same-sex couples 
made it even more discriminatory than Amendment 2.107 Given the signs 
that Proposition 8, like Amendment 2, was based on animus toward a 
particular class, the court then considered several purported rational ba-
ses for the law.108 Convinced by none, the Ninth Circuit held that no ra-
tional basis can justify Proposition 8’s withdrawal of California’s previ-
ously established same-sex marriage rights. For this reason, the court 
concluded, Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause.109 
To justify its withdrawal–withholding distinction, the Ninth Circuit 
again turned to Romer. The court reasoned that although the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not affirmatively require states such as Colorado to 
pass special statutory protections against discrimination, once those pro-
tections became law, the Equal Protection Clause does require that their 
repeal be justified by a rational basis.110 Judge Reinhardt explained, “The 
relevant inquiry in Romer was not whether the state of the law after 
Amendment 2 was constitutional . . . . The question, instead, was wheth-
er the change in the law that Amendment 2 effected could be justi-
fied.”111 For further support, the court cited U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, where the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a law that 
Congress passed in order to prevent “hippie” communities from receiv-
ing food stamps.112 Had Congress not previously elected to provide food 
                                                 
 105. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1081 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
 106. Id. at 1081. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Proponents of Proposition 8 offered four bases: “(1) furthering California’s interest in 
childrearing and responsible procreation, (2) proceeding with caution before making significant 
changes to marriage, (3) protecting religious freedom, and (4) preventing children from being taught 
about same-sex marriage in schools.” Id. at 1086. 
 109. Id. at 1095. 
 110. Id. at 1083. This is why the court saw no reason to express its opinion on the existence of 
a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Id. In Romer, there was no claim that Colorado citizens 
had a fundamental right to the specific protections provided by the antidiscrimination statutes struck 
down by Amendment 2. The Court merely held that singling these laws out for eradication was 
discriminatory. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644–34 (1996). To the Ninth Circuit then, it was 
immaterial whether the Constitution guaranteed a fundamental right to marry—the only important 
fact was that the right existed and Proposition 8 took it away. See Perry, 671 F.3d at 1064. 
 111. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1083. 
 112. Id. at 1084 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
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stamps, the Equal Protection Clause would not have been at issue be-
cause there is no fundamental right to food stamps.113 But once Congress 
provided food stamps, the withdrawal of that benefit from a particular 
group of people was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis.114 
Analyzing Proposition 8 with this understanding of Romer and Moreno, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the right to same-sex marriage is like 
food stamps and antidiscrimination statutes: while withholding the right 
might be constitutional,115 withdrawing it without a rational basis is not. 
To summarize, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Walker’s ruling, 
but in doing so, limited its holding to situations where a state has con-
ferred the right to same-sex marriage but has then taken it away. This 
limitation is based on the notion that Romer and Moreno stand for the 
proposition that, in equal protection terms, withdrawing an existing right 
is different than failing to provide it at all.116 
IV. RIGHT RESULT, WRONG REASON: WHY PERRY V. BROWN SHOULD 
HAVE BEEN DECIDED MORE BROADLY 
Although the Ninth Circuit’s holding provided a favorable outcome 
for proponents of marriage equality in California, its narrowness makes 
little sense. A careful analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protec-
tion jurisprudence reveals that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion should 
have been broader—the court should have held that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits the withholding, not just the withdrawal, of the right to 
same-sex marriage. 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence Fails to 
Support the Narrowness of the Ninth Circuit’s Holding in Perry v. Brown 
Perry’s narrow holding was met with mixed reviews.117 Yet consid-
ering that the decision invalidated Proposition 8, the debate was, surpris-
ingly, not split along the ideological lines that typically divide the debate 
                                                 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Again, Judge Reinhardt expressed no opinion on this issue. Had he done so, however, few 
commentators doubt that he would have held in favor of marriage equality. Known to many as the 
“liberal lion on the Ninth Circuit,” see infra note 127, he is so famously progressive that the Onion 
satirized his role on the bench as follows: “In accordance with my activist agenda to secularize the 
nation, this court finds Christmas to be unlawful.” Activist Judge Cancels Christmas, ONION (Dec. 
14, 2005), http://www.theonion.com/articles/activist-judge-cancels-christmas,1856. 
 116. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1084. 
 117. Compare Mazzone, supra note 98 (criticizing the opinion as “dishonest and foolish”), 
with Dan Markel, The Savvy of Perry, PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 7, 2012, 11:09 PM), http://prawfs 
blawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/02/the-savvy-of-perry.html (applauding the opinion as 
“[g]enius”). 
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over same-sex marriage. In fact, some of the heaviest criticism came 
from supporters of same-sex marriage who felt that Judge Reinhardt had 
decided the opinion too narrowly.118 Because the decision only applies in 
states that have withdrawn—as opposed to withheld—same-sex marriage 
rights, Perry is quite conservative in its scope. Take Washington for ex-
ample. The state legislature passed a measure legalizing same-sex mar-
riage in early 2012.119 But in Washington, a new law cannot take effect 
until ninety days after its legislative passage.120 This ninety-day period 
provides citizens who oppose the law a chance to veto it through the ref-
erendum process by putting the law to a statewide vote.121 So in 2012, 
opponents of marriage equality qualified Referendum 74 for the ballot,122 
which if passed, would have nullified the new law legalizing same-sex 
marriage.123 Referendum 74 failed.124 But if it had not, the right to same-
sex marriage would never have existed in Washington. Thus, in this situ-
                                                 
 118. William N. Eskridge Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the Constitutional Poli-
tics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.stanfordlaw 
review.org/online/perry-marriage-equality (“Judge Reinhardt’s Perry opinion has come under heavi-
er fire from commentators favoring marriage equality than from those opposed to equality.”). Some 
suggested that the court should have based its holding on substantive due process along the lines of 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), where the U.S. Supreme Court established a fundamental 
right to sexual intimacy. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Prop. 8 Simply Can’t Justify Itself, L.A. TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/13/opinion/la-oe-carpenter-proposition-eight-
ruling-20120213. Another possible avenue to overturn Proposition 8 may have been the Court’s sex 
discrimination jurisprudence. See Ilya Somin, Why Same-Sex Marriage Bans Qualify as Sex Dis-
crimination, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 7, 2012, 8:35 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/02/07/same-
sex-marriage-bans-and-sex-discrimination. 
 119. See Lornet Turnbull, Gregoire Signs Gay Marriage into Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 13, 
2012), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2017497028_gaymarriage14m.html. 
 120. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(d) (“No act, law, or bill subject to referendum shall take effect 
until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted.”). Any legislative act 
is “subject to referendum” unless it qualifies as one of the following: (1) an act necessary for preser-
vation of the public peace or (2) an act necessary to provide financial support to an existing public 
institution. Id. § 1(b); State ex rel. McLeod v. Reeves, 157 P.2d 718, 720 (Wash. 1945). 
 121. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 122. Referendum 74’s key ballot language was as follows: 
The legislature passed Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6239 concerning marriage for 
same-sex couples, modified domestic-partnership law, and religious freedom, and voters 
have filed a sufficient referendum petition on this bill. This bill would allow same-sex 
couples to marry, preserve domestic partnerships only for seniors, and preserve the right 
of clergy or religious organizations to refuse to perform, recognize, or accommodate any 
marriage ceremony. Should this bill be: [ ] Approved [ ] Rejected 
Referendum Measure No. 74, WASH. SEC’Y STATE, https://weiapplets.sos.wa.gov/MyVote/ 
OnlineVotersGuide/Measures?electionId=46&countyCode=xx (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). 
 123. Rachel La Corte, Wash. Voters Get Final Say on Gay Marriage Law, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019620143_apwagaymarriage3rdldwrite 
thru.html. 
 124. Rachel La Corte, Washington Voters Approve Gay Marriage, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019639931_apusgaymarriage3rdldwritethru.html. 
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ation, Perry would have provided no legal protection to the legislature’s 
law.125 While many commentators have understood Perry’s narrowness 
as an attempt to avoid reversal in the U.S. Supreme Court,126 detractors 
have questioned its legal reasoning.127 
Regardless of whether Judge Reinhardt’s attempt to avoid reversal 
will work, there are three reasons why the narrowness of Judge Rein-
hardt’s holding in Perry does not hold water when read in terms of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence: (1) the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s reliance on Romer was misplaced; (2) the distinction between 
withdrawing and withholding the right to same-sex marriage is not legal-
ly significant; and (3) if withdrawing the right to same-sex marriage vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause, then so does withholding the right. 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Reliance on Romer Was Misplaced 
Judge Reinhardt placed far too much emphasis on the fact that both 
Proposition 8 and Amendment 2 withdrew previously established rights; 
in doing so, he ignored the differences between the measures.128 One no-
table difference is that Amendment 2 was a constitutional amendment 
that eliminated a series of statutory rights—Proposition 8, by contrast, 
reversed a state supreme court interpretation of California’s constitu-
tion.129 Moreover, Amendment 2 eliminated a series of substantive legal 
protections, whereas Proposition 8 eliminated the right to the designation 
of marriage, but left the substantive rights associated with marriage intact 
because it did not affect California’s domestic partnership laws.130 
                                                 
 125. See West, supra note 12, at 48 (“Perry is thus of no relevance to cases challenging a 
state’s refusal to extend marriage to include gays and lesbians . . . .”). But see Eugene Volokh, 
Thoughts on the Ninth Circuit’s Same-Sex Marriage Decision, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 7, 2012, 
3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/02/07/thoughts-on-the-ninth-circuits-same-sex-marriage-decision 
(arguing that Perry cannot be limited to situations where a state has withdrawn a previously estab-
lished right). 
 126. See, e.g., David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, NYRBLOG (Feb. 9, 2012, 11:48 
AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling-gay-marriage (“The court goes 
to great lengths to . . . reduce the direct consequences of the decision for states that have not yet 
granted marriage status to same-sex couples, and thereby to render the decision of limited national 
significance, and less worthy of Supreme Court review.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Editorial, Proposition 8 Ruling Was Just But Wobbly, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/proposition-8-decision-was-just-but-wobbly/2012/ 
02/08/gIQApOh1zQ_story.html (“Judge Stephen Reinhardt, a liberal lion of the federal bench, at-
tempted to camouflage the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit as narrow and 
temperate, but it mischaracterized Supreme Court precedent to justify the nullification of Proposition 
8.”). 
 128. See Mazzone, supra note 98 (“Proposition 8 is nothing like Amendment 2 in Romer.”). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Editorial, supra note 127. 
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More importantly, however, in Romer, Justice Kennedy devoted 
much of his analysis to the withholding, not just the withdrawing, effect 
of Amendment 2. To the Court, the major problem with the Colorado 
initiative was that it forbade a class of citizens from attaining “safeguards 
that others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”131 On one hand, it is 
certainly true that Amendment 2 had the effect of withdrawing a right: 
before Amendment 2, LGBTQ citizens had the right to gain specific pro-
tections against discrimination; after Amendment 2, they did not. But the 
Court was not only concerned with the loss of a right; it was concerned 
with where that loss left the citizens that it affected.132 In other words, the 
Court was troubled by “the protections Amendment 2 withholds.”133 Ac-
cess to the safeguards prohibited by the law was necessary to enable 
LGBTQ citizens to lead “an ordinary civic life in a free society.”134 
Romer, then, in a very real sense, was concerned with much more than a 
mere “change in the law.”135 While Romer certainly stands for the princi-
ple that animus is never a legitimate basis for removing rights from a 
specific group, it also stands for the principle that animus is never a legit-
imate excuse for not providing those rights in the first place.136 In strik-
ing down Amendment 2, the Court signaled its disapproval of any law 
that imposes a significant legal disability on a specific group, regardless 
of whether the group had been free from that disability in the past. 
In this way, Amendment 2 and Proposition 8 are quite similar—
both voter measures not only withdrew preexisting rights, they also had 
the effect of withholding rights by making them harder to acquire. Propo-
sition 8 withdrew the right to marry and left same-sex couples in Califor-
nia with no option for recovering the right other than pursuing their own 
amendment to the state constitution. This is just like Amendment 2 inso-
far as it left LGBTQ citizens with no option to secure rights other than 
“enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution.”137 
Judge Reinhardt erred in reading Romer to stand for the principle that 
legal protections, once provided, cannot be taken away even though they 
                                                 
 131. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 132. See Mazzone, supra note 98. 
 133. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1083 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (emphasis removed). 
 136. Cf. Toni Lester, Adam and Steve vs. Adam and Eve: Will the New Supreme Court Grant 
Gays the Right to Marry?, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 253, 288 (2006) (understanding 
Romer to stand for the principle that “[l]aws making it harder for one group of citizens to seek help 
from the government, as opposed to others, are contrary to the Fourteenth amendment’s equal pro-
tection clause”). 
 137. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
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might not have been necessary in the first place. As one commentator put 
it, “Romer doesn’t stand for the freewheeling proposition that if the state 
gives you something it can’t later take it away.”138 The Court was con-
cerned with more than the fact that Amendment 2 withdrew rights—the 
Court was equally concerned with the fact that it withheld rights. 
2. The Distinction Between Withdrawing and Withholding the Right to 
Same-Sex Marriage Is Not Legally Significant 
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit omitted an important U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion from its analysis: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.139 Similar to Romer and Moreno, the Court in Cleburne 
declared unconstitutional a law that burdened a disadvantaged class—but 
that law did not withdraw a previously established legal right. 140  In 
Cleburne, a municipal zoning ordinance required a special permit to 
build housing facilities for mentally ill citizens, yet it did not require the 
same for otherwise similar facilities.141 After a group applied to construct 
a mental health housing facility, the City of Cleburne rejected its applica-
tion for failure to fulfill the terms of the special permit requirement.142 
The Court held that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause 
because the City of Cleburne had no rational basis to restrict the availa-
bility of building permits for mental health housing facilities.143 
Unlike Amendment 2 in Romer, the congressional measure in 
Moreno, or Proposition 8 in Perry, the zoning ordinance in Cleburne did 
not have the effect of withdrawing a previously held legal right. The City 
of Cleburne had enacted the permit requirement some fifteen years prior 
to denying the plaintiffs’ permit application.144 
                                                 
 138. Mazzone, supra note 98. To emphasize the problem with reading Romer this way, the 
same commentator further argued that: 
Reinhardt’s interpretation of Romer cannot be correct in a constitutional democracy. For 
it would mean that if a court construes a constitution to require the state to give a right to 
some class of people, it is necessarily unconstitutional to amend the constitution to over-
turn that ruling. Judges could, in other words, render their own interpretations of constitu-
tional provisions immune to correction. No plausible reading of Romer contemplates that. 
Id. 
 139. See Michael C. Dorf, When the Law Distinguishes Between Failure to Give and Taking 
Away, DORF ON L. (Feb. 13, 2012, 4:26 PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/02/actual-
constitutional-endowment-effects.html. 
 140. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); see Dorf, supra note 
10 (“Notably, the middle case in the trilogy, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, involves a failure 
to extend a legal right, not a taking away of an already-granted right.”). 
 141. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (No. 84-468). 
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Judge’s Reinhardt’s omission matters because Moreno and Romer 
cannot adequately be understood without also considering Cleburne. 
These three cases are widely regarded as a trilogy in which the U.S. Su-
preme Court employed a heightened form of rational basis review.145 As 
opposed to typical rational basis review, which is extremely deferential 
to the government, 146  the standard of review employed in Moreno, 
Cleburne, and Romer was more searching.147 To explain this departure, 
the Court has made clear that the difference is animus—in each case, the 
law at issue appeared to target a specific group and impose a legal disad-
vantage upon it.148 
Considering Cleburne, the fact that Proposition 8 withdrew a previ-
ously established right seems legally significant only to the extent that it 
provided evidence of animus. Along these lines, Judge Reinhardt ex-
plained that withdrawing a right shows a “deliberate purpose” to discrim-
inate: 
[We] consider Proposition 8 in light of its actual effect, which was, 
as the voters were told, to “eliminate the right of same-sex couples 
to marry in California.” The context matters. Withdrawing from a 
disfavored group the right to obtain a designation with significant 
societal consequences is different from declining to extend that des-
ignation in the first place . . . . The action of changing something 
suggests a more deliberate purpose than does the inaction of leav-
ing it as it is.149 
Read in isolation, this passage suggests that the court merely saw 
evidence of animus in California’s passage of Proposition 8. Were this 
the case, however, Judge Reinhardt would not have limited the applica-
bility of Perry’s holding by creating a legally significant distinction be-
tween the withdrawal and withholding of the right to same-sex marriage. 
                                                 
 145. See, e.g., Mark P. Strasser, “Defending” Marriage in Light of the Moreno-Cleburne-
Romer-Lawrence Jurisprudence: Why DOMA Cannot Pass Muster After Lawrence, 38 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 421, 431 (2005). 
 146. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma law 
that required prescription for any modification to eyeglasses); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 
449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting advertising on all vehicles except those 
in the delivery business). 
 147. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 59–64 
(1996) (“In these cases, rationality review, traditionally little more than a rubber stamp, is used to 
invalidate badly motivated laws without refining a new kind of scrutiny.”). 
 148. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 149. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) (emphasis added) (quoting OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 
54 (2008), available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm). 
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Indeed, the court relied on this distinction for more than evidence of 
animus.150 For example, when discussing the argument that Proposition 8 
furthers California’s legitimate interest in encouraging responsible pro-
creation, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that whether this interest would justi-
fy the act of withholding the right to marry is “irrelevant” to the act of 
withdrawing the right.151 In other words, whether California had a ration-
al basis to withhold the right was, to Judge Reinhardt, an unrelated mat-
ter because the court was concerned with whether California had a ra-
tional basis to withdraw the right. In these terms, California could have 
had a rational basis to withhold the right to same-sex marriage, but that 
same basis might have been irrational when used to rescind the right. To 
draw this distinction is to alter the rational basis inquiry such that cases 
where the government has failed to provide equal protection become in-
applicable to situations where the government has taken equal protection 
away. Thus, once the government provides a legal right, the act of with-
drawing that right will be subject to a different equal protection analysis 
than if it had never provided the right at all.152 
So does the difference between withdrawing and withholding a 
right matter? No. The Court in Romer and Moreno was troubled by the 
action of withdrawing legal rights because it provided evidence of ani-
mus, not because the government was under a heightened duty to leave 
the law unchanged.153 The withdrawal–withholding distinction does not 
have standalone legal significance in the U.S. Supreme Court’s equal 
protection jurisprudence. 
3. If Withdrawing the Right to Same-Sex Marriage Violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, Then So Does Withholding the Right 
In addition to the lack of legal support for the withdrawing-
withholding distinction, it simply makes no logical or moral sense to 
treat withdrawing a right as worse than not providing a right in the first 
place. 154  Under the court’s framework, Proposition 22, Protect Mar-
                                                 
 150. See Dorf, supra note 10. 
 151. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1088. 
 152. Professor Michael Dorf has criticized the Ninth Circuit for attributing an “endowment 
effect” to the Court’s holding in Romer. See Dorf, supra note 139. An endowment effect means that 
“people value things more highly if they already have those things than if they do not” and, argua-
bly, is an attribute of Takings Clause jurisprudence. See id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 153. See Dorf, supra note 10 (“The majority arguably reads Romer as standing for some sort of 
general proposition that it is unconstitutional for the government to bestow a legal right and then 
take it away, even though the government was under no obligation to bestow the legal right in the 
first place. But I don’t think Romer says that.”). 
 154. It makes little sense for another reason: by emphasizing the withdrawal of the right, Per-
ry’s holding logically applies only to same-sex couples old enough to marry during the 141-day 
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riage’s first initiative that sought to prevent same-sex marriage, would 
have been constitutional because, at the time it passed, the right to same-
sex marriage had never existed in California. Proposition 22’s only pur-
pose was to strengthen California’s already-existing laws against same-
sex marriage;155 as such, it sought to withhold, rather than withdraw. Yet 
the parallels between Proposition 8 and Proposition 22 are startling. Both 
measures were advanced by the same opponents of marriage equality, the 
only difference being that Proposition 22’s effect was prevention while 
Proposition 8’s was nullification. Drawing a distinction between the ef-
fects of these measures is to split hairs—in moral terms, withdrawing the 
right is wrong for the same reasons it is wrong to withhold the right. 
Thus, Judge Reinhardt’s logic begs the question: how can it be wrong to 
withdraw the right when it is not wrong to withhold the right? It cannot. 
The reason that withdrawing the right is unconstitutional is, in fact, the 
same reason that withholding the right is unconstitutional. The only dif-
ference is evidentiary—the act of depriving a legal right from a margin-
alized group might indeed look more discriminatory than not providing it 
in the first place. But this difference is meaningless. The withdrawal and 
withholding of a legal right both accomplish the same thing: the denial of 
a right. And as the following section argues, any denial of the right to 
same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
B. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Held that Denying the Right to Same-
Sex Marriage Violates the Equal Protection Clause, Regardless of 
Whether It Is Withheld or Withdrawn 
Given that Judge Reinhardt saw the “deliberate purpose” of Propo-
sition 8 as discriminatory, Perry’s holding could easily have amounted to 
a broad proclamation that any denial of the right to same-sex marriage is 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.156 Instead, the court mistook 
evidence for law—while it was correct to characterize Proposition 8’s 
withdrawal of the right to same-sex marriage as evidence of animus, the 
                                                                                                             
period when the right existed in California. If withdrawal, rather than denial, was the injury, then 
only those who had the right withdrawn were injured. See Jason Mazzone, Proposition 8’s Continu-
ing Constitutionality?, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:08 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2012/02/proposition-8s-continuing.html (“Because the circuit court’s decision was based on the 
injury caused by the withdrawal of a right, Proposition 8 arguably remains constitutional as to gays 
and lesbians in California who did not previously possess the right to marry. For example, gays and 
lesbians who came of age after Proposition 8 was adopted did not previously have a right to marry in 
the state.”). 
 155. In California, voter initiatives cannot be legislatively overturned. CAL. CONST. art. II, 
§ 10(c). 
 156. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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inquiry should not have stopped there.157 Had Judge Reinhardt addition-
ally asked why the right to same-sex marriage might be withheld in the 
first place, he could have only concluded that the “deliberate purpose” 
for “declining to extend . . . [the right] in the first place”158 is no different 
than the purpose for withdrawing the right. 
In support of this conclusion, the court would have needed to look 
no further than Loving v. Virginia, the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision striking down antimiscegenation laws.159 Among the Court’s 
reasons for invalidating laws against interracial marriage was the obser-
vation that these “prohibitions” served no legitimate purpose other than 
to further a regime of white supremacy.160 Although the Court reviews 
racial classifications under strict scrutiny,161 a legal fact that distinguishes 
Loving from Perry,162 Loving still illustrates an important point: the in-
validated laws had the effect of withholding the right to interracial mar-
riage. And the Court found “patently no legitimate overriding purpose” 
for doing so.163 If instead the State of Virginia had granted the right and 
then withdrawn it, the thought of the Court reaching a different conclu-
sion seems absurd. There is no way the Loving Court would have drawn 
a withdrawal–withholding distinction. Of ultimate significance to the 
Loving Court was that it could discern only one deliberate purpose for 
antimiscegenation laws: “to maintain White Supremacy.”164 Similarly, 
the Perry court’s equal protection analysis revealed no “legitimate pur-
pose” for Proposition 8.165 Had the court not limited its inquiry to the 
withdrawal–withholding distinction, Perry’s and Loving’s holdings 
would have looked a lot alike: any law that denies marriage equality on a 
purely discriminatory basis violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
Moreover, there is no meaningful difference between Proposition 8 
and the laws invalidated in the Moreno–Cleburne–Romer trilogy. With 
                                                 
 157. See Dorf, supra note 10. 
 158. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 
(U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
 159. Loving v .Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 160. Id. at 5, 7. 
 161. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Strict scrutiny is the most rigorous 
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 163. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11. 
 164. Id. at 7. 
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2013] Proposition 8 Is Unconstitutional 1267 
the exception of Cleburne, of course, the court agreed.166 Although the 
law at issue in each of these cases denied a substantive legal right, 
whereas Proposition 8 removed only the designation of marriage, this 
difference is meaningless.167 With poetic language168 and quotations from 
Shakespeare,169 the court spared no expense in stressing what it means to 
be married. Even though Proposition 8, by leaving domestic partnership 
laws undisturbed, had left intact the “incidents” of marriage—filing a 
joint tax return, for example—it had eliminated “the principal manner in 
which the State attaches respect and dignity to the highest form of a 
committed relationship.”170 Because “the designation of ‘marriage’ . . . 
serves as a symbol . . . of something profoundly important,”171 the court 
correctly acknowledged that the right to be married, while not necessari-
ly a substantive right, is just as important as one. 
Perry would have fallen nicely in line with Moreno, Cleburne, and 
Romer because Proposition 8 is about animus toward a specific group of 
people. As these U.S. Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, even ra-
tional basis review does not defer to laws with no explanation other than 
prejudice. Therefore, after Judge Reinhardt made clear that California 
lacked a rational basis to withdraw the right to same-sex marriage, he 
should have also held that the same would have been true had California 
failed to provide the right in the first place. 
This is exactly what Judge Walker did. The trial court invalidated 
Proposition 8 on the grounds that California lacks a rational basis to deny 
the right to same-sex marriage. 172  After extensive testimony, Judge 
Walker concluded that the only basis for Proposition 8 is “a desire to ad-
vance the belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior to same-
sex couples.”173 Based on this conclusion, the court found that Proposi-
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that case withheld, rather than withdrew, a legal right. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
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tion 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause because animus alone is never 
a rational basis for a law.174 The Ninth Circuit should have simply fol-
lowed Judge Walker’s lead.175 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, will 
soon have the chance to do so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence does not 
support the narrowness of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Perry.176 In 
reaching the holding, Judge Reinhardt misread Romer and Moreno and, 
by doing so, limited the applicability of Perry to situations where a state 
has provided the right to same-sex marriage but then eliminated it.177 
While the narrowness of the holding lacks support, the court reached the 
correct outcome—Proposition 8 violates the Equal Protection Clause.178 
But it does so not merely because it withdrew the right to same-sex mar-
riage. Proposition 8 is unconstitutional because there is never a rational 
basis to withdraw or withhold the right to same-sex marriage, and thus, 
any denial of the right violates the Equal Protection Clause.179 Hopefully 
the U.S. Supreme Court agrees. 
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